Hinton train Collision of 1986

The Hinton train collision was a rail transport accident that occurred in Canada on 8 February 1986. Twenty-three people were killed in a collision between a Canadian National Railway freight train and a Via Rail passenger train called the Super Continental, including the engine crews of both trains. It was the deadliest rail disaster in Canada at this time, since the Dugald accident of 1947 which had thirty-one fatalities, and was not surpassed until the Lac-Mégantic rail disaster in 2013, which resulted in 47 deaths.

After 56 days of testimony at a public inquiry, a commission concluded that the collision was caused by the freight crew failing to stop their train because of incapacitation or other unknown factors. The report also highlighted serious flaws in the culture and safety practices at Canadian National Railway.

Contents

 * 1Background
 * 1.1Passenger train
 * 1.2Freight train
 * 2Collision
 * 3Investigation
 * 4Dramatization
 * 5Similar accidents
 * 6See also
 * 7References
 * 8External links

Background[edit]
The collision occurred on a stretch of Canadian National Railway's transcontinental main line west of Edmonton, near the town of Hinton, Alberta. The towns of Jasper to the west and Edson to the east were nearby. Slightly over half of the 100-mile (160 km) stretch of track between Jasper and Edson was double-tracked, including 11.2 miles (18.0 km) of trackage from Hargwen control point west to Dalehurst control point. Traffic on this line was controlled with Centralized Traffic Control (CTC).

Passenger train[edit]
On the morning of 8 February 1986, No. 4 train - operated by Via Rail Canada - was traveling eastbound from Jasper to Edmonton on its transcontinental journey. The train, which combined Super Continental and Skeena, consisted of 14 units in the following order:


 * 1) FP7 Diesel locomotive number 6566
 * 2) F9B Diesel locomotive number 6633
 * 3) Baggage-Dormitory 617
 * 4) Coach-Snack Bar 3229
 * 5) Skyline Dome car number 513
 * 6) 4-8-4 Sleeping car 1139 Ennishore
 * 7) 4-8-4 Sleeping car 1120 Elcott
 * 8) FP9 Diesel locomotive number 6300 (inoperative)
 * 9) Steam generator car 15445
 * 10) Baggage car 9653
 * 11) Daynighter Coach 5703
 * 12) Cafe-Lounge 757
 * 13) 4-8-4 Sleeping car 1150 Estcourt
 * 14) Steam generator car 15404

The train's unusual composition was the result of two separate scheduled services from British Columbia being coupled together at Jasper. The front section, which had originated in Vancouver, consisted of two locomotives and five cars while the second (rear) section from Prince Rupert was led by one locomotive and five cars. A steam generator was coupled to the end of the train at Jasper for transfer to Edmonton depot for maintenance.

Engineers Mike Peleshaty, age 57, and Emil Miller, age 53, were in the lead locomotive. On board the train, were 94 passengers, 14 stewards and 7 crew (115 total).

Freight train[edit]
Canadian National Railway's westbound train No. 413 consisted of three locomotives, EMD GP38-2W number 5586, and 2 EMD SD40 numbers 5104 and 5062, followed by a high-speed spreader, 35 cylindrical hoppers loaded with grain, 7 bulkhead flat cars loaded with large pipes, 45 hoppers loaded with sulphur, 20 loaded tank cars, 6 more grain cars, and a caboose; a total consist of 3 locomotives and 115 cars. It was 6,124 feet (1,867 m) long and weighed 12,804 short tons (11,432 long tons; 11,616 t). On the lead locomotive were engineer John Edward "Jack" Hudson, aged 48, and brakeman Mark Edwards, aged 25. On the caboose, conductor Wayne "Smitty" Smith, aged 33.

Collision[edit]
The freight train left Edson at 6:40 am. About 38 km (24 mi) from Edson, it was halted at sidings outside Medicine Lodge to allow two eastbound trains to pass. It departed Medicine Lodge at 8:02 am, after traveling 5 km (3.1 mi) it reached Hargwen at 8:20 am where a section of double track started. The train dispatcher at Edmonton set the dual-control switch (DCS) so that the freight train took the north track.

At about the same time, the Super Continental was stopped at Hinton. It departed five minutes late on the single track. As the Super Continental approached the start of the double track section, the dispatcher from the CTC lined the dual-control switch at Dalehurst at 8:29 am. to the south track. With this setting, the absolute three-aspect signal at the Dalehurst control point on the north line would be switched to "stop". The signal, which was about 490 feet (150 m) before the end of double-track, had three solid red lights. These would indicate an absolute stop to the freight train which must not proceed any further.

Prior to the "stop" signal at the Dalehurst control point, a double-aspect approach signal was sited 13,600 feet (4.1 km) east of Dalehurst indicating the upcoming stop signal. This signal, showing yellow over red, indicated to a train crew they needed to reduce their train's speed to 30 miles per hour (48 km/h) and be prepared to stop at Dalehurst. However, as the freight train passed this advanced warning signal, the crash investigation found that the train was traveling at 59 miles per hour (95 km/h); 9 miles per hour (14 km/h) faster than the 50 miles per hour (80 km/h) speed limit for this stretch of track. No attempt was made by the crew of the freight train to slow down before or after passing the approach signal.

The freight train did not slow down as it passed the Dalehurst control point running through the switch into the section of single track. At 8:40 am, approximately 18 seconds after the lead locomotive of the freight train entered the single section it collided head on with the oncoming Super Continental (a collision would have been avoided had the service been on time).

Both lead locomotives were destroyed killing their crews. The front cars and freight wagons derailed. Diesel fuel from the locomotives ignited, engulfing them, the baggage car, and the day coach in flames; 18 of the day coach's 36 occupants died. Due to momentum, the cars on the freight train piled up on each other resulting in a large pile of debris. All three freight locomotives followed by 76 hoppers and tank cars were either destroyed or severely damaged.

On the passenger train, one coach was crushed by a freight car after it was thrown into the air by the force of the collision, killing one of its occupants. In the dome car, others were able to escape either through a window in the dome that had been broken by passengers, or through the hole left by the freight car. The two sleepers following the dome car derailed and were thrown on their sides causing injuries but no deaths. The mid train locomotive (6300) was severely damaged (It was repaired with a new cab section from a KCS EMD F7).) The last three passenger cars at the rear of the train did not derail, but there were many injuries.

After the rear of the freight train came to a halt, Conductor Smith in the caboose, attempted to contact the front of the train before contacting emergency services after seeing the fire.

Investigation[edit]
The Canadian government set up a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the crash. It was led by Justice René P. Foisy, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta. The inquiry lasted 56 days of public hearings and received evidence from 150 parties. The Foisy Commission published its full report on 22 January 1987.

The inquiry concluded that no one individual was to blame, instead it condemned what Foisy described as a "railroader culture" that prized loyalty and productivity at the expense of safety. As an example of lax attitudes to safety, Foisy noted that engineering crews that took over trains at Edson did so "on the fly". While the locomotive was moving slowly through the yard, the new crew would jump on and the previous crew would jump off. While this method saved time and fuel, it was a flagrant violation of safety regulations which required stationary brake tests after a crew change. Management claimed to be unaware of this practice, even though it was quite common. In regards to engineer John Hudson, the Foisy Commission concluded it was a possibility that the collision happened because he had either fallen asleep at the controls or had suffered a heart attack or stroke due his extremely poor health.

The report highlighted that there was no evidence that either train made any attempt to brake prior to the collision. Analysis of the line showed both trains would have only been visible to each other for the final 19 seconds before the collision. No conclusive reason could be found for the failure of the passenger train crew to react, neither was there any evidence that the Super Continental crew had made any errors before the accident. No evidence could be found to explain why the freight train failed to stop at the absolute signal at the Dalehurst control point. After a wrong-side signal problem was eliminated, human error was considered the only possible cause. Tests on the crews' remains ruled out drugs or alcohol as a cause, though it was revealed that the engineer of the freight train, Jack Hudson, was an alcoholic and heavy smoker who suffered from pancreatitis and type 2 diabetes, thus placing him at risk for a heart attack or stroke. The commission further criticized CN's ineffective monitoring of Hudson's health condition:

Another frequently ignored safety regulation mentioned in the report was the "deadman's pedal", which a locomotive engineer had to keep depressed for the train to remain underway. Were he to fall asleep or pass out, his foot would slip from the pedal, triggering an alarm and engaging the train's brakes automatically a few seconds later. However, many engineers found this tiresome and bypassed the pedal by placing a heavy weight (often a worn out brake shoe) on it. It was uncertain whether the pedal had been bypassed in this case because the lead locomotive of the train had been destroyed. A more advanced safety device was available, the reset safety control (RSC), which required crew members to take an action such as pushing a button at regular intervals, or else automatic braking would occur, but neither lead locomotive was equipped with this safety feature. While the second locomotive in the freight train was equipped with RSC, it was not assigned as the lead locomotive because it lacked a "comfort cab". Management and union practice was to place more comfortable locomotives at the front of trains, even at the expense of safety.

The report also noted that although the front-end and rear-end crews should have been in regular communication, that did not appear to be the case in this accident. As the freight train reached Hargwen, Engineer Hudson radioed back to Conductor Smith that the signals were green, a communication that was heard by a following freight. As it ran towards Dalehurst there was no evidence of further communication. The conductor is in charge of the train, so if Smith felt that the train was out of control or there were serious problems, he should have activated the emergency brake in the caboose to stop the train. However, Smith, who appeared to be nervous while testifying, said that he did not feel that the freight was ever out of control, misjudging its speed. He also testified that he attempted to radio Hudson on two radios and several channels, but neither seemed to be working, even though immediately after the crash Smith was able to contact the dispatcher by radio. Despite Smith's testimony, he apparently decided not to stop the train.